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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Wardwell Wayne Marsh, Jr., appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, entered upon his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he challenges the district
court’s order denying his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the relevant factual background of this case as follows:
On April 27, 2017, Pocatello Police Officer Miller noticed a vehicle without a
front license plate. The vehicle pulled into a residence and the driver got out as
Officer Miller initiated a traffic stop. The residence that the vehicle pulled into
did not belong to any occupants of the vehicle. While contacting Ryan Garrett,
the driver of the vehicle, Officer Miller observed small puncture marks on his
arms consistent with intravenous drug use. Officer Miller asked to see Garrett’s
registration and insurance. As Garrett was already out of the vehicle, he walked
over to the passenger side and asked the occupant, who turned out to be Wardwell
Marsh, to exit so that he, Garrett, could retrieve his information from the glove
box. As Marsh exited, Officer Miller noticed a small, orange plastic cap on the
floor which appeared to be a hypodermic syringe cap. He recognized this too as
something associated with intravenous drug use.
Upon seeing this cap, and in conjunction with his earlier observations of
Garrett’s arms, Officer Miller requested a K-9 unit to perform an exterior sniff of
the vehicle. Following a positive indication from the K-9 unit, officers searched
the vehicle and discovered an Altoid [sic] tin stuffed between the center console
and the driver’s seat. This tin contained baggies of methamphetamine. After
finding this tin, officers searched Garrett, Marsh, and the backseat passenger,
Ambrossia Leach. Marsh admitted having drugs on his person and officers
subsequently found two baggies containing methamphetamine and one baggie
containing marijuana. Marsh was arrested.
(R., pp.80-81.)
The state charged Marsh with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.46-47.) Marsh
filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of
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his constitutional rights because, he asserted, the traffic stop “evolved into an illegal detention.”
(R., pp.58-59.) Following a hearing on the motion (R., pp.65-66), the district court denied the
suppression motion (R., pp.80-90).

Thereafter, Marsh entered a conditional guilty plea,

reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion. (See R., pp.103-11.)
Pursuant to his guilty plea, the district court entered judgment against Marsh and sentenced him
to five years with three years fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed him on probation for a
period of four years. (R., pp.138-40.) Marsh filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.144-47.)
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ISSUE
Marsh states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Marsh’s motion to
suppress the evidence found on his person.
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Marsh failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence?
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ARGUMENT
Marsh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
Marsh challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-11.) Application of the correct legal standards to the unchallenged,
relevant facts of this case shows no error in the district court’s conclusion that the search of
Marsh was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The district court should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

C.

Marsh Has Failed To Show Clear Error In Any Of The District Court’s Factual Findings
Relevant To The Legal Analysis Of This Case
As a prefatory matter, Marsh challenges a few of the district court’s findings of fact.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.) Marsh claims that there is no support for the district court’s findings
(1) that none of the occupants of the vehicle lived at the residence in front of which they were
pulled over; (2) that Officer Miller first saw the syringe cap on the passenger floorboard as
Marsh exited the vehicle; (3) that officers found baggies, as opposed to a single baggie, of
methamphetamine in the Altoids tin; and (4) that Marsh admitted that he had drugs on his
person. (Id.) Marsh does not challenge the ultimate truth of any of these findings; only their
province: He recognizes that these facts are included within the police report created at the time
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of the incident (see R., pp.11-12), but asserts that they were not presented during the hearing on
his suppression motion.
First, contrary to Marsh’s assertions, the district court’s factual finding—that the officer
noticed the syringe cap as Marsh exited the vehicle—is a reasonable inference supported by the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing. Officer Miller explained that, in order for the
driver to access his glove box and locate his paperwork, he had to shuffle with Marsh. (See Tr.,
p.5, L.14 – p.6, L.2.) Marsh’s exit and the driver’s entrance into the passenger seat to go through
the glove box, when the officer testified he noticed the syringe cap, appear to have been roughly
contemporaneous. (Id.) Of course, when the officer first noticed the syringe cap is, at best,
marginally relevant. Far more important to the legal analysis is where the officer noticed the
syringe cap. Even had the officer failed to notice the syringe cap until after the driver re-exited
the vehicle upon locating the rest of his paperwork, the fact that the syringe cap was found on the
floor of the passenger side of the vehicle would still contribute to the officer’s probable cause to
believe that Marsh was involved in drug crimes, as shown below.
Second, it appears that the balance of Marsh’s challenged findings are not at all relevant
to the legal analysis in this case: Whether any of the occupants of the vehicle lived at the
residence in front of which they had pulled over is merely a background fact and is irrelevant to
the legal analysis in this case. Similarly, the number of baggies of drugs found in the Altoids tin
is not the relevant issue; the relevant issue is that drugs were found in the Altoids tin. As will be
shown below, finding drugs in the car, which were accessible by Marsh, is what contributed to
the officer’s probable cause that Marsh was committing a drug crime. And whether, after
officers commenced searching Marsh, he acknowledged that he had drugs on his person has no
bearing on this case; the state was required to show that the officers had probable cause to search
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Marsh before the search commenced. Marsh has failed to show clear error in any fact found by
the district court relevant to the legal analysis in this case.

D.

The Search Of Marsh Was Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment
As the district court noted in its order denying Marsh’s motion to suppress, there were

four hurdles the state was required to clear in order to show that the evidence in this case was
obtained in a constitutionally valid manner: The legality (1) of the initial traffic stop; (2) of
requesting the drug-detection dog; (3) of searching the interior of the car; and (4) of searching
the individual passengers. (R., p.83.) As the district court correctly concluded, the state cleared
each of these hurdles. (R., pp.83-90.)

1.

The Initial Traffic Stop Was Lawful Under The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. While routine traffic stops by police
officers implicate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
because a traffic stop is more similar to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d
1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). “An investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon
specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about
to be engaged in criminal activity.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
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Initiating a traffic stop based on the officer’s actual observations of a traffic infraction is
reasonable. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Officer Miller pulled over the
vehicle in which Marsh was a passenger based on his observation that the vehicle lacked a front
license plate in violation of Idaho Code §§ 49-428 and 49-456. (Tr., p.3, Ls.9-24.) The initial
traffic stop, therefore, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

2.

Because The Traffic Investigation Led To Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug Crimes,
Extending The Traffic Stop To Call For A Drug-Detection Dog Was Lawful
Under The Fourth Amendment

Of course, a traffic stop, like other investigative detentions, must not only be justified at
its beginning, but must also be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in scope and
duration to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App.
2004). “The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the stop is
initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality
different from that which initially prompted the stop.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at
1224. Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer
asking questions unrelated to the stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458
(Ct. App. 1990). “The officer’s observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop
may—and often do—give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further
investigation by an officer.” Id. Where an officer’s investigation of the initial offense develops
“the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual,” the officer
may properly expand his investigation. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct.
1609, 1614-15 (2015); see also State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916-17, 42 P.3d 706, 709-10
(Ct. App. 2001).
7

In this case, upon contacting the driver of the vehicle, Officer Miller observed that he had
puncture marks on his arm consistent with intravenous drug use. (Tr., p.4, Ls.12-21; R., pp.8081.) And, as Marsh exited the vehicle and the driver opened the glove compartment to retrieve
his registration and other paperwork, the officer observed a syringe cap on the floorboard of the
vehicle. (Tr., p.5, L.14 – p.6, L.2; R., p.81.) As the district court correctly concluded, these
observations, made during the diligent pursuit of the initial traffic investigation, gave Officer
Miller the necessary reasonable suspicion to expand his investigation to possible drug offenses.
(See R, pp.83-84.) It was therefore reasonable for Officer Miller to contact Officer Shutes to
request his drug-detection dog before continuing with his traffic investigation.

3.

The Search Of The Vehicle Was Lawful Under The Fourth Amendment

Next addressing the warrantless search of the vehicle, the state notes that warrantless
searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967). One exception to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception,” which
allows warrantless searches of vehicles when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
572 (1991); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999). “Probable cause
is established if the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person
of reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched contained contraband or
evidence of a crime.” State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App.
2007) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982)).
“When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile
contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are
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drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant.” Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172
P.3d at 1148 (quoting State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 227, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005)).
“If probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle, then it justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents which could conceal the object of the search.” State v. Braendle, 134
Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000). When Officer Shutes arrived on scene, he
deployed his drug-detection dog, and that dog alerted on the passenger side of the vehicle. (Tr.,
p.22, Ls.1-24; p.23, Ls.9-16.) This gave the officers probable cause to search the vehicle,
including all containers located therein that could hold drugs, such as the Altoids tin. During the
subsequent search, the officers discovered methamphetamine in the Altoids tin. (Tr., p.9, L.11 –
p.10, L.5; p.23, Ls.17-21.)

4.

The Search Of Marsh’s Person Was Lawful Under The Fourth Amendment

While the automobile exception allows officers to search a lawfully stopped automobile,
including all containers within that vehicle, it does not generally extend to the occupants of the
vehicle. United State v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 (1948). But another exception to the
warrant requirement, which does allow for the search of persons, is the search incident to lawful
arrest.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).

Warrantless arrests based on

probable cause are lawful under the Fourth Amendment. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171
(2008); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003); I.C. § 19-603. Where an
officer’s search is justified under the search incident to lawful arrest exception, it is not necessary
that the person be formally arrested before the search takes place; rather, as long as officers have
the requisite probable cause to arrest at the time of the search, that search will be upheld. See
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980).

Probable cause is “the possession of

information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an
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honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty.” State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136,
922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) (citation omitted). In determining whether the state has met the
standard of probable cause, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances. Pringle, 540
U.S. at 371.
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, as set forth by the district court, the
officers had probable cause to believe that Marsh was committing drug crimes and, therefore, to
search him. (R., pp.88-90.) The syringe cap was found on the floor under where Marsh had
been seated in the vehicle. (Tr., p.5, L.23 – p.6, L.19.) The Altoids tin, which contained
methamphetamine, was found between the driver’s seat and middle console, within arm’s reach
of Marsh.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.12-19.)

Marsh therefore had access to both the drugs and the

paraphernalia, and officers had probable cause to believe that Marsh was involved in drug crimes
and to search him under the search incident to arrest exception.
On appeal, Marsh claims that the district court erred when it determined probable cause
existed. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-11.) Citing to Pringle, supra, and State v. James, 148 Idaho
574, 225 P.3d 1169 (2010), Marsh claims that the officer could not have probable cause to
believe that Marsh possessed the methamphetamine found in the car because, he argues, it was
more likely that the methamphetamine belonged to the driver. Neither case stands for such a
proposition. Rather, as these cases make clear, when drugs are found in a vehicle, absent some
evidence of exclusive control, the question is simply one of access to the drugs. See Pringle, 540
U.S. at 372 (where the drugs were accessible to all occupants of a vehicle, officers had probable
cause to believe each was guilty of possession). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he
substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Id.
at 371 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). When contraband is
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discovered in a relatively small area, such as an automobile, it is not unreasonable to believe that
the occupants may all be engaged in the same criminal enterprise. Id. at 373 (citing Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999)). Contrary to Marsh’s assertions, Officer Miller had
probable cause to believe that Marsh was guilty of possession of methamphetamine, and the
search of his person was therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 1
The district court correctly concluded that Officer Miller’s ultimate search of Marsh was
supported by probable cause and therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The initial
traffic stop was reasonable based on the officer’s observation of a traffic infraction.

The

extension of the initial detention to contact a drug-detection dog to investigate potential drug
crimes was reasonable based on the officer’s observations suggesting intravenous drug use, such
as the puncture marks on the driver’s arms and the syringe cap located beneath where Marsh was
sitting in the car. The search of the vehicle was reasonable based on the drug-detection dog’s
positive alert on the vehicle. And the search of Marsh was reasonable based on the discovery of
drugs within the car, which were accessible to Marsh, and the location of the syringe cap. Marsh
has failed to show any violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s order
denying Marsh’s suppression motion should be affirmed.

1

Marsh also asserts that he did not have access to the Altoids tin. (Appellant’s brief, p.11.)
This assertion is contrary to the district court’s factual findings. (See R., p.88 (“A search turned
up an Altoid [sic] tin containing methamphetamine which was found within reach of where
Marsh was sitting”).) That finding is supported by substantial evidence (see Tr., p.10, Ls.12-19),
and does not appear to be challenged on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Marsh’s suppression motion.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of August, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
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